Current Trends in Violent Conflict by Avis, William
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons 
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an 
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-
based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other 
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please 
contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
Current trends in violent conflict  
 
William Robert Avis 
University of Birmingham 
25.03.2019 
Question 
Current trends in violent conflict - Summarise the key findings in terms of drivers, responses and 
themes, and how and why these are changing over time. 
Contents 
1. Overview 
2. Trends in conflict 
3. Annotated bibliography 
4. References 
 
  
2 
1. Overview 
This rapid literature review presents the key literature that discusses current trends in violent 
conflict. The focus is upon recent ideas that are prevalent in literature from post-2015. The 
literature review draws on both academic and grey literature. The review includes both 
quantitative analyses of conflict data sets (Szayna et al, 2017a; 2017b; Watts, 2017) and 
qualitative analyses (Von Einsiedel, et al., 2017; Krause; 2016). The first section provides a 
summary of trends in conflict and the second provides an annotated bibliography highlighting 
some of the key papers and their findings.  
It is important to note that there is no single, agreed-upon definition of what constitutes violent 
conflict. The term may refer to civil war, ethnic war, and interstate war at high and low intensities 
as well as violence that falls short of war, such as militarised disputes, terrorism, and riots or 
strikes (Szayna et al., 2017b). It is also important to note that trends and drivers of conflict will 
intersect in complex ways (Kett, & Rowson, 2007). Indeed, whilst the terms imply the dynamic 
nature of the factors and processes that contribute to violent conflict, there is a great deal of 
debate about reducing conflict to one cause. Finally, there is a much debate amongst conflict 
studies scholars regarding the decline (PRIO, 2017; 2018; Szayna et al., 2017b), or not (National 
Intelligence Council, 2012; World Bank & United Nations, 2018), of violent conflict, over the past 
two decades with some highlighting a sustained downward trajectory and others a more 
complicated picture. 
Violent conflicts have also become more complex and protracted, involving more non-state 
groups and regional and international actors (World Bank & United Nations, 2018).. They are 
increasingly linked to global challenges such as climate change, natural disasters, cyber security 
and transnational organised crime (HM Government, 2015). There is also a need to explore, in 
more detail, the differences between interstate and intrastate conflict. 
The United Kingdom Government (HM Government, 2015) identified the following factors as 
likely to exert an influence on the nature and extent of violent conflict: 
 The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability.  
 The resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition.  
 The impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and wider technological 
developments.  
 The erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus 
and tackle global threats. 
This review finds that the above broad trends are continuing to exert an influence on the nature 
and extent of conflict and, in many ways, have been exacerbated by the increasing complexity of 
the International arena. Other key findings include: 
 This upsurge in violence occurs in a volatile global context where the balance of 
geopolitical power is in flux, and transnational factors like advances in information and 
communications technology, population movements, and climate change create risks and 
opportunities to be managed at multiple levels (World Bank & United Nations, 2018; 
Cilliers, 2018). 
 Conflict today is fluid, spreading across borders to affect broader regions, a result of the 
greater interconnectivity of countries; the same networks that allow for increased trade 
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and information flow can be exploited by organised crime and conflict entrepreneurs to 
spread violence. The regional impact of conflict and the flow of refugees from conflict 
situations add another international dimension (World Bank & United Nations, 2018; 
Social Science Research Council, 2018). 
 Violent conflicts in many contexts take place against a background of domestic 
grievances, particularly a breakdown in the prevailing social contract in these countries. 
These conflicts have been exploited by extremist groups, and have drawn in regional and 
global powers, who may influence or support, but rarely fully control, these (World Bank 
& United Nations, 2018; Watts, 2017). 
 The internationalisation of many intrastate conflicts also aids the spread of violence 
(Szayna, et al., 2017a; Von Einsiedel, et al., 2017; Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2018). 
 The global balance of power is shifting, growing economic power for emerging 
economies, and the achievement by many countries of middle-income status, brings 
demand for redistribution of global political influence. Long-standing alliances, such as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), are 
increasingly being questioned and many countries seek a renegotiation of power sharing 
in multilateral fora. It is widely argued that a transition to a multipolar world is under way, 
with new centres of military and economic power emerging (HM Government, 2015; 
World Bank & United Nations, 2018). 
 Violent conflict has regional dimensions, and there has been enhanced regional action in 
response. However, regional responses have been uneven in their ability to sustain 
peace. In some cases, regional competition fuels unilateral action, prolonging and 
aggravating conflicts and weakening the capacity of regional organisations to play a role 
in prevention of violent conflicts (HM Government, 2015; World Bank & United Nations, 
2018; Szayna, et al., 2017a; Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2018). 
While some argue war in is on the decline, others point out that it merely has taken on new 
forms. Increasingly, conflict environments feature not only state armies but also non-state armed 
groups, criminal gangs, drug-traffickers and terrorists. These actors employ new communications 
and weapons technologies, and frequently operate across national borders and regions, even 
though local allegiances are a critical dynamic of violence. This greater complexity in the 
production of violence has hampered efforts to respond to violent conflict around the world. 
There is a growing recognition that the international community’s conflict response toolbox, 
including expensive international interventions, is inadequate in the face of new empirical 
realities. 
2. Trends in conflict 
Today, conflicts have become more complex and protracted. About 2 billion people, circa a third 
of the world’s population, currently live in countries affected by conflict. Conflict is often linked to 
global challenges from climate change to human trafficking and contemporary violent conflicts 
are no longer defined by national borders. Schafer (2018) notes that conflicts cost an estimated 
$13.6 trillion every year and pose a significant threat to the 2030 agenda (Schafer, 2018). It is 
thus clear that actors need to understand the trends and address the drivers of conflict, including 
the tipping points that push fragility to violence. 
According to the Social Science Research Council (2018: 3) “conflicts and widespread violence 
have complex socio-cultural, economic, and political dimensions that operate through power 
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networks which transcend conventional conceptual boundaries, e.g. public vs. private or local vs. 
national”. They continue that the increasing complexity of violent conflict makes these conflicts 
particularly prolonged, deadly, and intractable, and that their nature also poses a challenge for 
those responding to conflict, as the international system remains ill-equipped to respond with 
adequate frames, analysis, and mandates across borders (SSRC, website)1. It is therefore 
necessary to interrogate trends in violent conflict and how, if at all, these change over time.  
More broadly, it is important to note that there is no single, agreed-upon definition of what 
constitutes violent conflict. The term may refer to civil war, ethnic war, and interstate war at high 
and low intensities as well as violence that falls short of war, such as militarised disputes, 
terrorism, and riots or strikes. Szayna et al. (2017a: 10) provide a typology of conflict highlighting 
its multifaceted forms (see table 1 below). 
Table 1: Typology of conflict 
Reproduced with kind permission of: RAND, 2017a, p.10 
 
It is a commonly held view (Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2018; Szayna et al., 2017b; 
Krause, 2016) that the nature, intensity, and frequency of conflict have evolved in recent years, 
shifting from wars fought directly between states to various forms of “internal” or intrastate 
violence, including insurgencies, guerrilla wars, terrorism, organised and large-scale criminal 
violence, and protests. However, the timing, speed, and permanence of these shifts vary and are 
not uniform for all types of violent conflict. This shift in nature of conflict, corresponds with a long-
                                                   
1 https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/understanding-violent-
conflict/?_cldee=c3VwcG9ydEBzc3JjLm9yZw%3D%3D&recipientid=contact-
f7ebf65bbbe5e71180ca005056ab0bd9-3775b21d27404f10a5923185e20a27fb&esid=0240122b-2902-e911-
a968-000d3a34afa9  
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term decline in traditional symmetrical conflicts (e.g. between armies), to increasing numbers of 
intrastate conflicts and asymmetric wars (e.g. between state and militia).  
Indeed, whilst this review will highlight broad global trends in violent conflict, it is important to 
interrogate how these factors operate at national and subnational levels. As argued by Kett and 
Rowson (2007), it is difficult to define war or violent conflict, let alone gather accurate data on its 
possible causes. They conclude that, this does not make it any the less important to understand 
why violent conflict occurs, rather that conclusions must be caveated. It is also important to note 
that trends and drivers of conflict will intersect in complex ways. Indeed, whilst the terms imply 
the dynamic nature of the factors and processes that contribute to violent conflict, there is a great 
deal of debate about reducing conflict to one cause. Whilst some have traditionally focused on 
grievance-related drivers of conflict, such as poverty and inequality, others have suggested that 
the incidence of violent conflict is dependent on material interests. 
Finally, there is much debate amongst conflict studies scholars regarding the decline, or not, of 
violent conflict, over the past two decades. Analysts and scholars who argue that a decline has 
been observed have proposed a number of hypotheses to explain the decline in the incidence of 
interstate conflict (Szayna et al., 2017b):  
 The seizure and annexation of land is less rewarding for developed societies (with a 
predominantly industrial or post-industrial, rather than agricultural, economic base) in an 
open international economy.  
 The military predominance of the United States (U.S.), a status quo power, means that a 
country considering an act of military aggression in a strategically important part of the 
world must anticipate the possibility of a U.S. response.  
 The rise of nationalism, spread of “technologies” of violent resistance (such as guerrilla 
warfare), and the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons has made it 
more difficult to pacify populations of conquered territories.  
 The rise of international consensus and norms against the forceful change of boundaries, 
accompanied by the commensurate rise of more effective international organisations that 
can enforce those norms, has made military aggression less attractive. 
Commentators have also suggested a number of possible explanations for the decline in 
intrastate conflict (Szayna et al., 2017b):  
 The gradual strengthening of state institutions associated with both a global increase in 
wealth and with the consolidation of postcolonial political orders, has made states better 
able to provide services to their populations and to police non-state violence.  
 Rising levels of wealth give a greater proportion of populations a stake in peace.  
 The spread of democratic forms of government and associated practices provide 
institutionalised mechanisms for nonviolent conflict resolution.  
 The rise of effective international conflict mediation mechanisms, coupled with a credible 
threat of external intervention (in particular, peace operations mandated by the United 
Nations (UN)), has provided both channels and incentives to defuse conflict before it 
escalates to the level of widespread violence. 
A number of commentators have challenged the “declinist” thesis. Their criticisms state, either 
that the quantitative data have been misrepresented or misinterpreted, or that the apparent 
trends are only a temporary anomaly and are likely to be undone by a range of new dynamics 
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that will fuel increases in conflict. Others suggest that even if the recent decline in violence is 
real, it is likely to be reversed by one or more of a number of future dynamics. Commentators 
such as Szayna et al. (2017b) highlight the following:  
 Globalisation may lead to a quick internationalisation of disruptions in one country, 
raising and magnifying what may be a local dispute to a systemic level.  
 Population pressures may lead to greater scarcity and conflict.  
 Climate change may induce disruptions and migrations that can overstress the capacity 
of states and lead to widespread unrest.  
 Rapidly evolving technology makes it easier for non-state actors to organise, and it 
makes even small numbers of people potentially highly lethal. 
What is clear from the above is that the complexity of the current international arena has led to 
both a change in the nature of violent conflict but also a shift in the drivers of conflict. It is 
acknowledged that the world is changing rapidly and fundamentally, driven by long-term shifts in 
the balance of global economic and military power, increasing competition between states, and 
the emergence of more powerful non-state actors (HM Government, 2015). The following section 
provides an overview of papers that explore the nature of contemporary conflict and potential 
drivers. This starts with an overview of the United Kingdom’s National Security Risk Assessment 
2015, which provides a baseline against which to explore shifting dynamics. 
3. Annotated bibliography 
HM Government (2015). National Security Risk Assessment 2015. 
HM Government. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/478936/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf  
The National Security Risk Assessment 2015 undertaken by the United Kingdom Government 
highlighted a series of domestic and global security challenges which had increased in scale, 
diversity and complexity since 2010 (HM Government, 2015). Four particular challenges were 
considered likely to drive UK security priorities for the coming decade with both immediate and 
longer-term implications (these are listed in greater detail in table 2 below):  
 The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability.  
 The resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition.  
 The impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and wider technological 
developments.  
 The erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus 
and tackle global threats. 
Table 2: The changing national security context and future implications (HM Government, 
2015: 15-22) 
Domestic and global security challenges 
Terrorism and Extremism  
A number of Islamist terrorist groups are active across the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, 
with increasing reach into Europe. The emergence of ISIL and its brand of violent extremism 
has significantly increased the threat. ISIL now operates over much of Syria and Iraq, and has 
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affiliates in other countries. ISIL has recruited foreign fighters from most countries in Europe 
and across the Islamic world. Extremist and terrorist groups have exploited the internet and 
social media to distribute large online propaganda intended to radicalise and recruit. 
Impact of instability 
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has shown how crises can trigger and accelerate instability 
across a region, and the challenges created by state failure or a lack of effective, publicly 
legitimate and accountable governance. Such challenges include regional instability, large-
scale humanitarian need, mass migration and human trafficking, and exploitation of weak 
governments or ungoverned space by terrorist groups and criminals. Instability overseas also 
undermines affected countries’ prospects for poverty reduction and economic growth. Many 
drivers of instability are likely to persist over the medium to long term, including social 
inequality and exclusion, demographic changes, rapid and unplanned urbanisation, climate 
change, and global economic and other shocks. 
Migration 
Migration is a global challenge. Instability, extremism and conflict in the Middle East and Africa 
have displaced millions of people. Many have sought to travel to Europe, creating a 
humanitarian challenge and pressures across the EU. Longer-term trends, including increased 
access to information through mobile technology and social media, are adding to the drivers of 
migration, as are the activities of criminal networks. 
Serious and organised crime 
Serious and organised crime has a direct impact on security, economy and reputation. The 
volume and severity of serious and organised crime threats are growing, as more services and 
transactions take place online, internet access expands across Africa and Asia, and technology 
develops. 
Global health security 
The risks to health security will continue to grow as the world becomes more physically 
interconnected through travel. Countries and regions with weak health services or where 
government ability to respond is poor are especially vulnerable. The Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa is an example. 
The resurgence of state-based threats 
Russian behaviour 
Russia has become more aggressive, authoritarian and nationalist, increasingly defining itself 
in opposition to the West. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continuing support to 
separatists in eastern Ukraine through the use of deniable, hybrid tactics and media 
manipulation have shown Russia’s willingness to undermine wider international standards of 
cooperation in order to secure its perceived interests. 
Wider state competition 
State competition can be a risk to stability. In the Middle East and North Africa, regional powers 
have been pursuing competing security interests, driven by growing military and economic 
capabilities. Both South Asia and South East Asia continue to grow in economic importance 
and political significance, but this has come with increased tensions, exacerbated by 
unresolved historical disputes. 
The role of technology 
Cyber 
Growing numbers of states, with state-level resources, are developing advanced capabilities 
which are potentially deployable in conflicts, including against critical national infrastructure and 
government institutions. And non-state actors, including terrorists and cyber criminals can use 
easily available cyber tools and technology for destructive purposes. 
Wider technological developments 
Technology will also become available to more state and non-state actors, including terrorists, 
organised crime groups and cyber criminals. This could reduce Western states’ technological 
advantage as controls on access to knowledge and materials become harder to maintain. 
The rules-based international order 
The context is changing, driven by developments such as the growing role of non-state actors, 
the impact of technology and longer-term shifts of economic wealth to the south and east of the 
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world. The Chinese economy is expected to become larger than that of the US in the 2020s, 
while other emerging markets, in particular India and Brazil, have the potential to grow 
markedly in power and influence. While the U.S., Japan and Europe will remain global 
economic powers, they face a growing imperative to improve their economic dynamism and 
competitiveness if they are to stay at the cutting edge of the global economy. 
 
Such changes create new challenges and opportunities. The rules-based international order 
has always relied for its effectiveness and legitimacy on the active participation and 
contribution of all states, in particular major states, and on the ability of institutions and 
relationships to adapt to reflect new opportunities and challenges. It will therefore be important 
to reflect the contribution of growing powers. We will continue to work with partners to adapt 
the rules-based international order to meet new challenges. 
 
Some powerful states and non-state actors, however, are increasingly ignoring international 
norms that they believe run contrary to their interests, or favour the West. Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea, Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and the challenges around non-state 
actors’ compliance with international humanitarian law are examples of this. 
Continuing risks 
Major natural disasters overseas 
Major natural disasters overseas can put at risk safety and security of British nationals, our CNI 
and the supply chains on which we rely, such as energy, food and technology.  
Energy security 
Global energy security can be affected by regional disputes, instability, terrorism and cyber 
threats, and more positively by technological developments. 
The global economy 
Advanced economies have made a slow though meaningful recovery from the global economic 
crisis. But progress has been uneven and vulnerabilities remain, particularly in the euro area 
and Japan. Recent downward revisions of long-term growth potential in both advanced and 
emerging economies are a concern, and should spur action to deliver structural reforms that 
can drive long-run productivity growth. Despite considerable progress, China still faces 
significant challenges in delivering the necessary reforms for a more sustainable growth model. 
Commodity exporters face difficult adjustments amid declining prices. The growing level of 
corporate debt in emerging markets increases risks, especially where it leads to greater foreign 
currency exposure. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and continuing instability in the Middle East, 
North and West Africa illustrate the scope for political disputes adversely to affect global 
markets and regional growth prospects. 
Climate change and resource scarcity 
By 2030, the world could face demands for 50% more food and energy and 30% more water, 
while their availability becomes threatened by climate change. The Middle East and North 
Africa region will be particularly at risk, given existing high levels of water stress and high rates 
of population growth. Sub-Saharan Africa may suffer from climate change impacts on crop 
production in particular. Rising sea levels threaten coastal cities and small islands. More 
frequent extreme weather events are likely to disrupt populations, agriculture and supply 
chains, making political instability, conflict and migration more likely. 
World Bank & United Nations (2018). Pathways for Peace: Inclusive 
Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28337/211162mm.pdf  
This report highlights the main messages from the Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to 
Preventing Violent Conflict study and is a result of an academic exercise by the staff of the World 
Bank and the UN. The study finds that since 2010, the number of major violent conflicts has 
tripled, and fighting in a growing number of lower intensity conflicts has escalated. In 2016, more 
countries experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly 30 years. Much of this violence 
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remains entrenched in low-income countries, yet some of today’s deadliest conflicts are 
occurring in countries at higher income levels with stronger institutions. At the same time, more 
conflicts are internationalised, as countries intervene in support of a party or parties in another 
country’s conflict. Other key findings include: 
 This upsurge in violence occurs in a volatile global context where the balance of 
geopolitical power is in flux, and transnational factors like advances in information and 
communications technology, population movements, and climate change create risks and 
opportunities to be managed at multiple levels. 
 Conflict today is fluid, spreading across borders to affect broader regions. In part, this is a 
deliberate strategy, but it is also a result of the greater interconnectivity of countries; the 
same networks that allow for increased trade and information flow can be exploited by 
organised crime and conflict entrepreneurs to spread violence. The regional impact of 
conflict and the flow of refugees from conflict add another international dimension 
 Violent conflicts in many contexts in the Middle East and North Africa take place against 
a background of domestic grievances, particularly a breakdown in the prevailing social 
contract in these countries in which citizens had access to jobs in a large public sector, 
free education and health care, and subsidised food and fuel, while experiencing limits on 
free expression and a certain degree of elite capture of the economy. These conflicts 
have been exploited by extremist groups, and have drawn in regional and global powers, 
who may “influence or support— but rarely fully control—those fighting on the ground.” 
 Violent conflict in Africa has also increased against the backdrop of the continent’s rapid 
economic and political changes. Poverty, and to some extent inequality, is decreasing 
and economic growth has enabled a number of countries to reach middle-income status. 
Many countries have adopted more open political systems, although with some reversals 
in 2015. In some countries, tensions have risen around competition for political power, 
sometimes deepening inter-group divisions and leading to an eruption of open violence 
 Some of the most virulent extremist groups in the region have exploited divisions, 
connecting them to transnational ideologies. Localised conflicts have fed into regional 
conflict systems, facilitated by ethnic, linguistic, commercial, and cultural relationships. 
 The internationalisation of many intrastate conflicts, in which an outside state intervenes 
on behalf of a party to the conflict, also aids the spread of violence. In 2015, more 
conflicts (20) were internationalised than in any year since 1946. Internationalised 
conflicts declined slightly, to 18, in 2016. 
 The increased complexity and reach of today’s violent conflict contribute to its 
intractability. While conflicts that ended in 1970 tended to last an average of 9.6 years, 
conflicts that ended in 2014 had lasted an average of 26 years, and those that ended in 
2015 lasted 14.5 years.  
 The global balance of power is shifting, growing economic power for emerging 
economies, and the achievement by many countries of middle-income status, brings 
demand for redistribution of global political influence. Long-standing alliances (e.g. the 
NATO and the EU) are increasingly questioned and many countries seek a renegotiation 
of power sharing in multilateral fora (e.g. the UN and international financial institutions). 
Some states are increasingly seeking to redraw normative boundaries in key areas, 
(such as human rights or the status of women). It is widely argued that a transition to a 
multipolar world is under way, with new centres of military and economic power 
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emerging. In the face of such geopolitical fluidity, tensions inevitably arise and risks can 
be difficult to manage. 
 Violent conflict has regional dimensions, and there has been enhanced regional action in 
response. However, regional responses have been uneven in their ability to sustain 
peace. In some cases, regional competition fuels unilateral action, prolonging and 
aggravating conflicts and weakening the capacity of regional organisations to play a role 
in prevention of violent conflicts. 
Violent conflict is increasingly recognised as one of the big obstacles to reaching the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The study concludes with eight key messages:  
 Violent conflict is surging after decades of relative decline. Direct deaths in war, refugee 
numbers, military spending, and terrorist incidents, inter alia, have all reached historic 
highs in recent years. A rapidly evolving global context presents risks that transcend 
national borders and add to the complexity of conflict.  
 The human and economic cost of conflicts around the world requires more collaborative 
work. Development actors need to provide more support to national and regional 
prevention agendas, through targeted, flexible, and sustained engagement. Prevention 
agendas, in turn, should be integrated in development policies and efforts.  
 The best way to prevent societies from descending into crisis is to ensure they are 
resilient through investment in inclusive and sustainable development. For all countries, 
addressing inequalities and exclusion, making institutions more inclusive, and ensuring 
that development strategies are risk-informed are central to preventing conflict.  
 States are central to efforts to prevent conflict, but, in today’s shifting global landscape, 
they are one actor among many.  
 Exclusion from access to power, opportunity, and security creates fertile ground for 
mobilisation to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or 
contexts of human rights abuses.  
 Preventing violence requires departing from traditional economic and social policies 
when risks are building up, or are high, and seeking inclusive solutions through dialogue, 
adapted macroeconomic policies, institutional reform in core state functions, and 
redistributive policies.  
 Enhancing the meaningful participation of women and youth in decision-making, as well 
as long-term policies to address the economic, social, and political aspirations of women 
and young people are fundamental to sustaining peace.  
 In order to achieve more effective prevention, new mechanisms need to be established 
that will allow the various tools and instruments of prevention, in particular diplomacy and 
mediation, security, and development, to work in much greater synergy. 
See also this PPT presentation by Alexandre Marc (Chief Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and 
Violence World Bank Group) – Conflict and Violence in the 21st Century: Current Trends as 
Observed in Empirical Research and Statistics -  https://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-
content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Conflict-and-violence-in-the-21st-century-Current-trends-as-
observed-in-empirical-research-and-statistics-Mr.-Alexandre-Marc-Chief-Specialist-Fragility-
Conflict-and-Violence-World-Bank-Group.pdf  
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Von Einsiedel, S. et al. (2017). Civil War Trends and the Changing 
Nature of Armed Conflict. UNU-CPR. 
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6156/Civil_war_trends_UPDATED.pdf   
This UNU-CPR Occasional Paper provides insights into major recent trends in violent conflict, 
and analyses the implications of these trends for international actors engaged in conflict 
prevention and management. It finds that: 
 After declining for much of the 1990s, the number of major civil wars has almost tripled in 
the past decade. The number of minor civil wars have also risen in recent years, largely 
due to the expansion of the Islamic State and its affiliates. 
 From 2011 to 2017, there has been a six-fold increase in battle deaths, with 2014 and 
2015 being the deadliest years on the battlefield since the end of the Cold War. 
 With a decline in civil wars ending in military victory, the conflict relapse rate has 
increased. 60% of conflicts in the early 2000s relapsed within five years. 
 Some forms of violence against civilian populations in wartime are increasing, posing 
challenges to the protection of civilians. Among the key trends, we see is that: a larger 
share of today’s mass atrocities takes place in the context of civil wars; rebel groups 
have become increasingly responsible for the majority of civilian deaths; and the number 
of displaced people due to violence is at an all-time high. 
 Conflicts are becoming more intractable and less conducive to traditional political 
settlements mainly due to three developments: 
o Organised crime has emerged as a major stress factor that exacerbates state 
fragility, undermines state legitimacy, and often lowers the incentives of armed 
groups to enter political settlements. 
o The internationalisation of civil wars tends to make them deadlier and longer; 
o The growing presence of jihadist groups in conflict settings complicates peace 
making and fosters a “hunker down and bunker up” mentality among international 
actors, especially UN peace operations, on the ground. 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). (2018). Trends in Armed 
Conflict, 1946–2017. PRIO. https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=11181   
The Conflict Trends project aims to answer questions relating to the causes, consequences and 
trends in conflict. The project contributes to new conflict analyses within areas of public interest, 
and works to produce thorough and quality-based analysis. Their annual report for 2017 
comments that, 2017 was one of the most violent years since the end of the Cold War. While 
violence levels decreased slightly from the all-time high of 2016, non-state conflicts and 
internationalised intrastate conflicts continue to challenge the international community’s ability to 
achieve global peace. The main findings were as follows:  
 The number of state-based armed conflicts in the world declined slightly from 53 in 2016 
to 49 in 2017, with the Islamic State active in 31% of them. 
 The number of non-state conflicts increased from 62 in 2016 to 82 in 2017. 
 There was a decline in conflict casualties in 2017. 22% fewer people died in 2017 as a 
direct result of conflict, and 32% fewer than in 2014. Syria is still the deadliest conflict in 
the world accounting for one third of all casualties in state-based conflicts in 2017. 
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 Internationalised conflicts and non-state conflicts continue to represent major threats to 
reductions in violence. 
PRIO. (2017). Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2016. PRIO. 
https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1373&type=publicationfile  
The Conflict Trends project’s annual report for 2016 comments that 2016 was the fifth most 
violent year in the world since the end of the Cold War. While violence levels were lower than in 
2014 and 2015, ongoing conflicts with serious regional impacts were challenging the international 
community’s ability to ensure global peace. The main findings were as follows:  
 There was a decline in battle casualties in 2016. 14% fewer people died in 2016 as a 
direct result of conflict than in 2015, and 22% fewer than in 2014.  
 The number of armed conflicts in the world declined slightly from 52 in 2015 to 49 in 
2016.  
 The internationalised conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan have the highest number of 
casualty levels globally.  
 The trend in the increasing internationalisation of conflicts is concerning, as these 
conflicts, on average, last longer, are more violent, and are more difficult to solve. 
Watts, S. (2017). Understanding Conflict Trends: a Review of the 
Social Science Literature on the Causes of Conflict. Rand 
Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1063z1.html 
This review presents the results of an extensive literature review undertaken by the Rand 
Corporation. The results are broken down into two major groupings: interstate conflicts and 
intrastate conflicts. The author notes that contemporary conflicts tend to be insurgencies or civil 
wars. In the past, a much greater share of conflicts occurred between states. Many explanations 
have been advanced to explain this phenomenon, including the evolution of the global economy, 
changing international norms of behaviour, and the pre-eminence of the U.S. in the international 
state system. While there are several competing explanations for this change in conflict patterns, 
the authors assert that the fact that the pattern has changed is clear. 
The literature reviewed in this document suggests that a wide variety of factors might have 
important relationships with different types of conflict. These heterogeneous findings are 
reflective both of the depth of the literature and of the complexity of how and when armed conflict 
occurs. However, some of the factors reviewed are more strongly supported in the literature than 
others. The authors review identifies ten key factors as having the most clearly established 
relationship with armed conflict and the greatest potential to affect future conflict trends. They are 
listed below, with a short explanation for each: 
 The capacity of state institutions. Institutional capacity affects a state’s ability to 
provide public goods to their populations and to maintain effective and disciplined 
security services.  
 The prevalence of consolidated democracies. Consolidated democracies are those 
that have successfully implemented a range of effective institutional rules and legal 
procedures constraining the executive, mandating popular election of political leaders, 
and ensuring civil, political, and minority rights.  
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 The degree of ethnic and sectarian polarisation. Societies become polarised along 
ethnic or sectarian lines as ethnicity, religion, or both become factors for group 
identification, forming the basis for political organisation and the lens through which 
grievances are framed.  
 The rate of economic growth. High growth rates tend to ease distributional conflicts 
and provide resources for the state to regulate conflict.  
 The extent of economic interdependence. Economic interdependence refers to how 
states’ economies are interrelated with each other and with the global economy. There 
are two key characteristics of economic interdependence that influence countries’ 
likelihood of conflict. First, countries’ economic outcomes are affected by external 
conditions, such as demand in another country or a global economic shock. Second, 
economic interdependence tends to inhibit conflict insofar as disrupting a country’s ties to 
the international economy would hurt its domestic economy. 
 The degree of U.S. pre-eminence. The international state system is characterised by 
hierarchy in terms of power. U.S. pre-eminence is built on the U.S.’ military power, its 
large share of the international economy, its central role in international governance, and 
its position as a supporter and enforcer of international norms.  
 The capabilities of international organisations. International organisations can 
undertake key tasks in the international system, including developing solutions to cross 
border problems, mediating disputes, shaping and enforcing international norms, 
disseminating information, and generating shared interests and potentially aligning 
states’ preferences. The capabilities of international organisations to undertake these 
tasks depend on the amount of authority and resources states delegate to them.  
 The strength of international norms. Strong international norms are ones that are 
universally held and for which there is relatively universal consensus on the need for 
norm enforcement. Weaker norms might only be held by (or applied to) some states, or 
might be held more broadly but lack support for punishing states that violate the norm.  
 The diffusion of lethal technology. Diffusion of lethal technology refers to greater 
access by states and non-state actors to the technologies necessary to build and deploy 
lethal weapons, including nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons; 
precision munitions; or disruptive cyber technology.  
 The extent of resource stress due to population pressures. Resource stress arises 
from the scarcity of renewable resources to support the population living in the area. 
Resource scarcity increases environmental insecurity. The main sources of resource 
scarcity include: (1) supply-induced scarcity, in which resources are consumed at a faster 
rate than they can be regenerated; (2) demand-induced scarcity, in which previously 
stable resource consumption increases through a rise in population or consumption per 
capita; and (3) structural scarcity, in which the distribution of resources is uneven and 
some groups have limited access to resources. 
Interstate Conflict - Implications for Global Trends and Future Conflict: Overall, this report 
suggest that interstate conflict is likely to continue to decline in the near future, or at least remain 
at historically low levels. Many of the factors that have been identified as important to the decline 
in such conflict appear to be relatively stable, particularly. However, this review should not be 
interpreted as confirming that this decline in interstate conflict is irreversible. The literature has 
noted a number of potential developments that could undermine or reverse the effects of 
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peaceful trends. The factors that could reverse this trend are of particular interest and importance 
to policymakers, and they are therefore highlighted below. 
 Breakdown in Consensus: Order rests on a broad consensus among powers on how 
order should operate in political, economic, and security affairs. This order has been 
extremely beneficial for most of the powerful states in the system, and their support for 
the existing order is therefore robust. However, Chinese acceptance of this order has 
thus far been conditional, joining such institutions as the WTO while opposing such 
global norms as those regarding foreign intervention. As China’s relative power within the 
system increases, it might feel freer to challenge aspects of this order that do not align 
with its preferences. Such a challenge could, in the long term, threaten the post-1945 
institutional and normative structure that undergirds many positive developments. Global 
economic and demographic trends will inexorably erode the traditional powers share of 
power within the international system.  
 Increase in Weak State Capacity: Some states, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, 
might currently be inhibited from pursuing interstate conflicts because of their extremely 
low levels of institutional capacity. As such, economic and political development in those 
states might increase interstate conflict, even while high levels of development in other 
states continue to restrain it. 
 Messy Democratisation: While mature democracies are highly pacific, the initial stages 
of democratisation are often accompanied by conflict. Countries that have not begun any 
sort of democratic transition, that do so could result in an increase in instability and 
interstate conflict. 
 Demographic Pressures: As global population continues to increase, greater 
competition for finite resources could lead to an increase in interstate conflict. Although 
increases in international trade have thus far allowed for more efficient sharing of 
resources and have decreased conflict, this trend might not hold in the face of 
continuously increasing global population. 
 Environmental Pressures: Climate change could reduce arable land, food, and water 
resources, combining with demographic pressures to increase competition and conflict. 
Interstate conflict over resources appears to be rare. Other studies have emphasised that 
resources can also be a source of cooperation. Cross-border water resources in appear 
to be more frequently a source of cooperative behaviours between states. 
Intrastate Conflict: While the incidence of war between states has been declining, trends in 
intrastate violent conflict have been more ambiguous. High-intensity intrastate conflicts (those 
with 100,000 or more deaths caused directly by violence in a single year) have been rare since 
the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the number of medium- and low-intensity intrastate conflicts 
(those with 1,000–100,000 and fewer than 1,000 battle deaths, respectively) peaked during the 
late Cold War. After an abrupt decline following the end of bipolar rivalry, their overall incidence 
has crept back up in the past few years. 
Implications for Global Trends and Future Conflict: This report identifies a number of factors 
that are particularly likely to shape the future of conflict and should be closely monitored: 
 The Rise of Non-state Actors: There has been a shift in power between states and non-
state actors. A variety of factors have contributed to this change, including the end of the 
Cold War, changing norms about political participation, and new mechanisms for political 
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organisation. Perhaps most important of all has been the role of technological change in 
facilitating communication among non-state actors.  
 Good Governance: Studies of intrastate conflict typically find that mature democracies 
are the most stable form of government, but that democratisation processes and 
intermediate regime types (such as “illiberal” or “quasi” democracies) are associated with 
higher levels of conflict. The world has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of at 
least partially democratic governments over the past few decades. If these democracies 
are able to consolidate themselves, it could significantly improve levels of intrastate 
conflict. Moreover, the literature suggests that democracies are better able to cooperate 
with one another at the international level; successful democratic consolidation might 
facilitate agreements among democracies, which in turn would have second- and third-
order consequences for the incidence of intrastate conflict.  
 Economic Growth and Instability: Economic development is strongly associated with 
stability. The general trend has been toward ever-higher income levels (as measured, for 
instance, in GDP per capita). This report highlights, however, that the global economic 
order that has endured since the end of the Second World War is coming under severe 
strain. If persistent economic crises prevail in the coming decades, then the incidence of 
violent intrastate conflict is likely to rise dramatically. 
 Proxy Conflicts: Were the current general agreement on the “rules of the game” among 
the great powers to collapse, however, we might well see the return of patterns of 
intrastate conflict that predominated during the Cold War. As nuclear weapons and other 
high-end military capabilities proliferate, middle-rank powers might feel sufficiently secure 
against reprisals that they can afford to engage in proxy conflicts in regions of interest. 
 Technology: Technology has an ambiguous relationship on the incidence of intrastate 
conflict. It can dramatically increase the lethality of conflict, however. The diffusion of 
increasingly lethal technologies, such as bioengineering and precision weaponry, could 
increase the costs of conflict, both globally and for the U.S. in particular.  
 Neo-Malthusian Crisis: The literature has found that demographic pressures and 
resource scarcities can exacerbate existing problems, but the primary drivers of conflict 
lie elsewhere (for instance, in poor governance and weak economic performance). It is 
possible however, that climate change or other environmental dynamics might finally 
overtake humanity’s ability to compensate through innovation. An intense and 
widespread neo-Malthusian crisis could spark an increase in intrastate conflict.  
Szayna, T. et al. (2017a). Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: an 
Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future 
Conflict Projections. Rand Corporation. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1063.html 
This report provides an overview of conflict trends and conflict drivers. The project assessed the 
debate in three steps.  
 The project gathered data on conflict trends from sources of aggregate conflict data. 
From these data sources, the researchers selected those data sets that used reliable 
sources of data and a transparent methodology for classifying and aggregating conflicts. 
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 The project undertook a review of the academic literature on the causes of conflict. This 
review served as the basis for developing ten “key factors” that drive violent conflict. 
Quantitative indicators of each of these factors were also derived.  
 The project used the quantitative data on violent conflict and drivers of conflict to assess 
conflict trends up to 2040. The team assessed conflict trends using historical data on the 
recent incidence of conflict. The team then assessed how changes in the ten key factors 
might lead to changes in the future incidence of conflict. Lastly, the team developed a 
tool that allows readers of the report to “mix and match” assumptions to see how varying 
these assumptions should be expected to influence the future incidence of conflict. 
Table 3 summarises the impact of the identified ten key drivers of change in future incidence of 
conflict relative to the baseline conflict projections. The first column lists the key factors. The 
second column identifies the expected effect of an increase in each factor on projections of 
interstate conflict. The third column captures the expected effect of a decline in each of the key 
factors on projections of interstate conflict. Columns 4 and 5 present the expected effect of 
increases and decreases in each factor on the incidence of intrastate conflict relative to baseline 
projections of conflict. 
Table 3: Ten key drivers of change in conflict incidence 
Key Factors Expected Effect of Change in Factor on Conflict incidence 
 Interstate Conflict Intrastate Conflict 
 Increase in Key 
Factor 
Decrease in Key 
Factor 
Increase in Key 
Factor 
Decrease in Key 
Factor 
Capacity of state 
institutions 
No Effect No Effect Less Conflict More Conflict 
Degree of ethnic and 
sectarian polarisation 
Slightly More Conflict No Effect No Effect Slightly Less Conflict 
Prevalence of 
consolidated 
democracies 
Less Conflict More Conflict Slightly Less Conflict Slightly More Conflict 
Rate of economic 
growth 
Slightly Less Conflict Slightly More Conflict Less Conflict More Conflict 
Extent of economic 
interdependence 
Less Conflict Slightly More Conflict No Effect No Effect 
Capabilities of 
international 
organisations 
Slightly Less Conflict More Conflict No Effect Slightly More Conflict 
Degree of U.S. pre-
eminence 
Slightly Less Conflict More Conflict No Effect Slightly More Conflict 
Strength of 
international norms 
Slightly Less Conflict Slightly More Conflict Slightly Less Conflict Slightly More Conflict 
Diffusion of lethal 
technology 
Slightly More Conflict No Effect Slightly More Conflict No Effect 
Extent of resource 
stress because of 
population pressures 
No Effect No Effect Slightly More Conflict No Effect 
Reproduced with kind permission of: RAND, 2017a, p. xix  
For interstate conflict, the key conflict drivers identified are the prevalence of consolidated 
democracies, the capabilities of international organisations, and the degree of U.S. pre-
eminence.  
For intrastate conflict, the key conflict drivers are the capacity of state institutions and the rate of 
economic growth. However, these factors are closely intertwined. Weak institutional capacity 
reduces countries’ economic opportunities, while weak economic growth reduces governments’ 
resources to increase governance. As a result, declines in these two factors would create 
vulnerabilities expected to increase intrastate conflict that would be difficult to mitigate. 
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Trends in interstate violence: Trends in interstate violence suggest a significant decrease in 
the incidence and intensity of armed conflict. This result is true regardless of the database 
considered, and appears to apply to violence at all intensities. The trend for disputes and crises 
that fall short of major war is somewhat more ambiguous. For these events, the downward trend 
is less definitive, but there is little evidence of an upward trend. 
Trends in Intrastate Violence: Intrastate conflict includes all forms of violence that occur within 
a state, ranging from war to riots and anti-government demonstrations. Because it encompasses 
many different types of violence, intrastate conflict is measured by a large number of different 
data sets and incorporates many different trends. Aggregate trends in intrastate conflict appear 
to follow the same patterns observed for interstate violence, specifically a general decline in 
frequency of conflict and intensity of conflict since the end of the Cold War, although there has 
been an uptick in some types of intrastate armed conflict since 2012. This trend applies equally 
to civil and ethnic conflict, is most dramatic for high-intensity violence, and is once again 
consistent across data sets. However, trends in other forms of low to medium intrastate violence, 
particularly involving non-state and societal actors, including riots, protests, demonstrations, and 
terrorism, show more limited evidence of this consistent downward trend and in some cases 
have trended upward in recent years. 
This review of various types of intrastate conflict that fall short of war suggests that unlike more 
intense forms of intrastate violence, these lower-intensity and nonviolent events do not seem to 
follow an unambiguous downward trend. Instead, while several have declined since their peak, 
these trends appear to fluctuate much more over time and in recent years seem to be increasing 
in frequency, as well as scope, in some cases. These forms of conflict may continue to be 
relevant security concerns, especially when they escalate or trigger instability elsewhere. 
Szanya, T. et al. (2017). What are the Trends in Armed Conflicts and 
what do they mean for U.S. Defence Policy? Rand Corporation. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904
.pdf  
This report provides an overview of trends in armed conflict and explores potential impacts on 
U.S. defence policy. The report highlights that the current global security environment is highly 
unpredictable, leading the U.S. to face simultaneous security challenges from traditional state 
actors and trans-regional networks of sub-state groups - all taking advantage of rapid 
technological change. These security challenges reflect a variety of factors, including a highly 
interconnected and interdependent global economy, the unprecedented stress on the earth’s 
resources created by population growth, the creation of new and highly fragile sovereign states, 
and the rapid rise of emerging powers outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere. It is asserted in this 
report that these security challenges have, in turn, increased the potential for armed conflicts to 
emerge, a potential that seems borne out by conflict in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Yemen, 
Libya, and elsewhere.  
To better understand the drivers of armed conflict, the authors examined the literature on this 
subject, focusing on scholarly work that used rigorous empirical approaches. The research 
identified 12 key factors as the primary drivers of the incidence of conflict (see table 4). 
Table 4: Primary drivers of the incidence of conflict (Szanya, et al., 2017:3) 
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Capacity of state institutions Degree of ethnic and sectarian polarisation 
Prevalence of consolidated democracies Rate of economic growth 
Extent of economic interdependence Capabilities of international organisations 
Degree of U.S. pre-eminence Strength of international norms 
Diffusion of lethal technology Degree of resource stress because of population pressures 
Degree of regional hegemony Degree of territorial contestation 
The authors suggest that a quick review of these factors suggests why conflict has declined over 
the past decades. The world has experienced a dramatic expansion in economic growth and 
international trade, which has elevated many out of poverty and has given them a stake in a 
stable environment conducive to further development and the accumulation of wealth. These 
trends have been accompanied by the development of many stronger and more-democratic 
states, allowing for conflict resolution mechanisms that defuse or resolve conflicts peacefully. As 
these factors have become more prevalent, the incidence of conflict has generally declined 
alongside them. However, these positive trends have not been evenly distributed, and many 
states or regions continue to be plagued by frequent armed conflict. Nevertheless, the long-term 
global trends in these key factors help to explain why conflicts have generally become less 
frequent, the wars of the past few years notwithstanding. Moreover, the potential for these trends 
to continue into the future supports the belief that the observed long-term decline in armed 
conflict may persist. The report provides projections for future conflict. The projections for both 
interstate and intrastate conflict slope downward going into the future. The authors conclude: 
 Conflict trends do not follow straight lines. Even though armed conflict has on average 
declined over the past several decades, there are periodic spikes in levels of armed 
conflict followed by periods of relative peace. Just because conflict is projected to decline 
over the long term does not mean that it will do so year on year. 
 Although levels of armed conflict are slowly declining globally, these trends differ among 
regions. The Middle East was shown to be likely to remain highly unstable over the 
coming generation. Alternative scenarios analysed show the potential for major war if 
political relations in East Asia change dramatically in the coming decades, and recent 
Russian actions have raised questions about armed conflict in Europe. 
 Even if armed conflict continues to decline, this does not necessarily indicate lower 
demand for military forces. In fact, even as armed conflict declined in the post-Cold War 
era, the frequency of deployments of land forces for military interventions rose. 
 The U.S.’ military preponderance may be a part of the explanation for the decline in 
armed conflict. This report assessed the role of U.S. forward military posture and nuclear 
capabilities, finding that both deterred some level of interstate conflict. U.S. pre-eminence 
may also have subtler effects, such as the creation and support of international 
institutions and norms that some rising powers are challenging.  
To test these drivers/trends in conflict and what these mean for the U.S., the authors generated a 
number of scenarios to test assumptions.  
19 
Cilliers, J. (2018). Violence in Africa Trends, drivers and prospects 
to 2023. Institute for Security Studies. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254122  
This report presents a big-picture analysis of recent conflict trends in Africa based on an analysis 
of the structural drivers of conflict with a time horizon to 2023. It first presents recent conflict 
trends including slowly declining fatality rates in several countries, noting Africa’s large burden of 
non-state conflict and the increase in riots and protests. The report then turns to seven structural 
(or deep) drivers of violence, and how they are likely to impact Africa in future.  
Cilliers reports that Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor, young and badly governed, but 
also because it is growing and dynamic. He suggests that unlike elsewhere, Africa is not 
experiencing a democratic regression and protest is more acceptable public behaviour in many 
countries since an increased number are electoral democracies. This is reflected in the changed 
nature of violence where the ballot, not the gun, is slowly becoming the main source of political 
contestation, accompanied by a shift in focus to instability in urban rather than rural areas. Key 
findings include: 
 The launch in 2013 of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 coincided with a strong upward 
trend in armed conflict to peak in 2015. The subsequent trend has been downward, with 
violence involving militant Islamist groups (and state responses) remaining most resilient.  
 It is unlikely that Africa will be able to “silence the guns by 2020”, or indeed by 2023. Yet 
progress in advancing peace, stability and growth is evident across the continent.  
 Effective responses to violent Islamist extremism in key countries would rapidly reduce 
armed conflict in Africa.  
 The countries likely to continue having high levels of armed violence are Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Burundi, Libya, Cameroon, Angola and Chad.  
 South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Kenya and Somalia will probably continue 
experiencing high levels of political protest and riots, but Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, 
Cameroon, Rwanda, Madagascar and Angola have higher per capita protest levels.  
 In the long term only much more rapid, inclusive economic development combined with 
good governance and developmentally oriented leadership will make Africa less 
vulnerable to violence and instability. 
Beyond external developments, such as a potential global economic downturn, broadly seven 
structural relationships explain violence in Africa and will largely determine future levels. These 
relate to poverty, democratisation, regime type, population age structure, repeat violence, the 
bad-neighbourhood effect and poor governance. The propensity towards violence emerges from 
the collective impact and interaction of some or all of these drivers. Even then, violence typically 
requires politicisation and triggering event(s). 
 High levels of poverty and exclusion: Large portions of poor people in a country often 
correlates with weak state capacity since limited tax revenues accrue to the government 
which means that it has limited capacity and human resource capacity is generally low. 
 Democracy and democratisation: As levels of income and education increase, 
countries transition from unrepresentative systems first to (thin) electoral democracy. 
Should general human development continue, states develop the institutions and norms 
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that embed the rule of law ensuring respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the 
executive by the judiciary, as well as by the legislature – all characteristic of liberal (thick) 
democracy. These transitions seldom proceed smoothly or in a linear fashion. 
 Regime type and regime dissonance: The nature of regimes (democratic or autocratic, 
thin/ electoral democracy or thick/liberal democracy) affects conflict vulnerability. 
 Youthful population: Large youth bulges, are robustly associated with an increased risk 
of conflict and high rates of criminal violence in poor countries, particularly when young 
people lack opportunities in terms of education, training and employment and have no 
sense of voice and participation. However, youth bulges appear to be more closely 
related to low-intensity conflict than to civil war. 
 Repeat violence: Once a country has experienced large-scale violence, the chances of 
recurring violence is strong. In recent years, the trend towards conflict recurrence has 
been more common than the onset of new conflicts on the continent. 
 Bad-neighbourhood effect: Being situated in a conflict-ridden region is a major risk 
factor and these countries are more likely to experience the spill over effect of instability. 
According to the World Development Report 2011, a country making development 
advances, such as Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7% of GDP every year for each 
neighbour in conflict. 
 Poor governance: At low levels of income and development, the nature of the governing 
elite is more important for economic growth and the achievement of positive development 
outcomes than the extent to which countries are democratic or authoritarian. Hence, 
countries that are fortunate enough to produce a developmentally oriented governing 
elite grow much more rapidly, particularly if this is in the form of a cohesive governing 
party or coterie of leadership that is clear in its pursuit of development. 
 Climate change: As climate change alters the nature of resource dependence, it may 
have consequential effects on states with large natural resource benefits. But eventually 
people fight based on the mobilisation of perceptions of exclusion and injustice. Africa will 
experience widely different effects from climate change in the coming decades that will 
strain the ability of the environment to support local populations under current 
developmental conditions. Some areas of the continent are likely to become warmer and 
drier, and thus experience more frequent and severe droughts close to major population 
centres (e.g. Cape Town). Other parts of the continent may experience widespread 
drought and potentially famine without proper government intervention, or experience 
more extreme rains, which could also adversely affect crops and food security. 
While some argue war in is on the decline, others point out that it merely has taken on new 
forms. Increasingly, conflict environments feature not only state armies but also non-state armed 
groups, criminal gangs, drug-traffickers and terrorists. These actors employ new communications 
and weapons technologies, and frequently operate across national borders and regions, even 
though local allegiances are a critical dynamic of violence. This greater complexity in the 
production of violence has hampered efforts to respond to violent conflict around the world. 
There is a growing recognition that the international community’s conflict response toolbox, 
including expensive international interventions, is inadequate in the face of new empirical 
realities. 
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Krause, K. (2016). From Armed Conflict to Political Violence: 
Mapping & Explaining Conflict Trends. Daedalus Volume 145, Issue 
4. p.113-126. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00416  
This essay makes the case that adopting a broad understanding of political violence, including 
violence committed by the state and its agents, and nonphysical violence as the violation of basic 
rights, is essential to gain insight into the causes and consequences of, and to frame appropriate 
responses to, war and violence. Krause continues that most contemporary lethal violence does 
not occur in conflict zones, the majority of states most affected by lethal violence are not at war, 
and the levels of lethal violence in many non-conflict settings are higher than in war zones. Much 
of this non-war violence is organised, not random, and political in nature. A narrow focus on wars 
and formal armed conflicts thus obscures the high levels of everyday violence and insecurity 
around the world. Krause notes that there are four facts about contemporary violence  
1) most lethal violence does not occur in conflict zones;  
2) the majority of states most affected by lethal violence are not at war;  
3) the levels of lethal violence in some non-conflict settings are higher than in war zones; 
4) much of this violence is organised, non-random, and in some sense political. 
More broadly, Krause contends that an exclusive focus on war means we know little about how 
we get from such things as state repression or group violence to civil war and what the 
consequences might be for international and regional order. Although scholars have moved away 
from a focus on large-scale organised violence to analyse such things as terrorism, non-state 
armed groups, the micro-dynamics of civil war, and subnational and transnational violence, the 
political dimension of violence itself remains under conceptualised.  
He continues that if we wish to understand the links between different kinds of violence, 
processes of escalation, and social and political consequences, at least two kinds of neglected 
violence should be brought into the picture. The first is violence that has been “made legal”; the 
most widespread forms of legal violence being the use of force by authorised agents of the state, 
police, gendarmes, paramilitaries, and others, especially when this goes beyond what would be 
considered as the legitimate use of force by such agents. There is good reason to conclude that 
large-scale violence can escalate upward from a host of deeply entrenched and enduring micro 
level violent exchanges or struggles for power. 
A second important generative consequence of violence is temporal, and can be seen in the 
relationship between conflict and post-conflict violence. Finally, seemingly disconnected forms of 
violence can be linked in complex ways. Sexual violence in and after conflicts, especially in parts 
of West Africa, is connected to broader conflict and violent dynamics, and the specific, often 
exclusive, focus on sexual violence hampers understanding of the relationship between sexual 
violence and other ‘ungendered’ violence. These forms of violence are manifestations of the 
same systemic failures and mechanisms. 
Krause concludes that even low-level but sustained violence can have long-term systemic and 
structural consequences that affect processes of state-building and decay, create cross-border 
sources of regional instability, and distribute power away from state institutions. The erosion of 
the state’s practical monopoly over the use of violence, the steady proliferation of more powerful 
and sophisticated weapons to non-state armed actors, the relative ease with which “violence 
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entrepreneurs” can operate in many parts of the world, and the weak and fragile nature of many 
state institutions intended to provide safety and security are all worrying trends. 
4. Conflict Analyses  
Herbert, S. & Husaini, S. (2018). Conflict, instability and resilience in Nigeria. Rapid Literature 
Review 1427. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of 
Birmingham. http://gsdrc.org/publications/conflict-instability-and-resilience-in-nigeria/ 
Herbert, S. & Idris, I. (2018). Refugees in Uganda: (in)stability, conflict, and resilience. Rapid 
Literature Review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. 
http://gsdrc.org/publications/refugees-in-uganda-instability-conflict-and-resilience/    
Herbert, S. (2017). Conflict Analysis: Topic Guide. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of 
Birmingham. http://www.gsdrc.org/topic-guides/conflict-analysis/ 
Avis, W. & Herbert, S. (2016). Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Somalia. (Rapid 
Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of 
Birmingham. http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Fragility_Migration_Somalia.pdf 
Herbert, S. (2014). Conflict analysis of Liberia. Rapid Review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, 
University of Birmingham. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/LiberiaCA.pdf 
Herbert, S. Dukhan, N. and Debos, M. (2013). State fragility in the Central African Republic: what 
prompted the 2013 coup? Birmingham: 
GSDRC. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CAR_GSDRC2013.pdf 
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